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ABSTRACT ■ This article offers a systematic comparison of strategic responses
of Austrian and German unions to an emergent sector. It aims to increase
understanding of both union movements, and also to contribute conceptually to
the study of the varieties of unionism. The concept of ‘core strategies’
facilitates more systematic comparisons of unions’ strategic responses to
apparently similar challenges and helps explain why – despite many similarities
in their industrial relations systems and the uniform development of the call
centre sector in both countries – the strategic responses of Austrian and
German unions differ remarkably in terms of content, priority and timing.
KEYWORDS: Austria ■ call centres ■ Germany ■ industrial relations ■ trade
union strategies
Introduction
The core of both Austrian and German industrial relations is the dual
system of interest representation based on a division of work between
unions and works councils (Jacobi et al., 1998; Traxler, 1998). Germany
and Austria are thus typically treated as two ‘most similar cases’;1 yet
systematic comparisons between them, in terms of the industrial
relations systems or varieties of unionism, are rare (for an exception see
the contributions in Endruweit et al., 1985). This article, by contrast,
points to key differences in the logics underlying Austrian and German
unionism.
Though trade unions in most Western European countries are currently
facing similar political, economic and social challenges, very little system-
atic comparative research on their strategic responses has been undertaken.
The emergent call centre sector is closely associated with several of the
current challenges to unions in advanced capitalist countries: vertical dis-
integration of large companies, increased outsourcing, a structural shift
from manufacturing to services, and the growing significance of atypical
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employment. Thus, the call centre sector poses a litmus test to the logics
underlying current Austrian and German unionism.
To facilitate systematic comparison, this article introduces the concept
of union core strategies. Mapping the variegated impact of apparently simi-
lar challenges on unions’ strategic capacities within and across countries
helps ‘contextualize’ the comparison and avoid the pitfalls of comparing
‘apples and oranges’ (Locke and Thelen, 1995; Schregle, 1981). This
enables us to understand both the intra-country and the cross-country
variations in unions’ strategic responses in terms of their content, intra-
union priority and timing.
The call centre sector emerged in a similar fashion in both countries,
with a reconfiguration of established sector and market boundaries.
Today, three types of call centres exist: internal, spin-off and subcontract-
ing (Batt et al., 2005; Holtgrewe, 2005; Schönauer, 2005). Internal call
centres are the classic type: organizational units within companies. Spin-
off call centres are mostly former internal centres which still limit their
activities to the parent company. Subcontracting call centres operate as
outsourcing partners for various clients.
To capture the specific logic of sector formation, the strategic responses
of German and Austrian unions are analysed and systematically com-
pared across three key segments (mail order business, telecommunications
and subcontracting call centres) and over time in three periods (sector
establishment, sector expansion and sector consolidation), each character-
ized by specific competitive relations between the different segments.2
This increases the number of observations (nine in each case) as well as the
generalizability of the empirical findings (Landman, 2004).
The article derives from research within the NODE-project (New
Orientations for Democracy in Europe) of the Austrian Federal Ministry
for Science and Research. The primary sources are 18 structured interviews
the author conducted with union officials in both countries, covering three
themes: problem perception, internal strategies and external strategies. The
unions concerned were ver.di (Vereinte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft), its
predecessors HBV (Handel, Banken und Versicherungen), DPG (Deutsche
Postgewerkschaft) and DAG (Deutsche Angestellten-Gewerkschaft)3 as
well as the peak confederation DGB (Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund) in
Germany; and GPA (Gewerkschaft der Privatangestellten) and the peak
confederation ÖGB (Österreichischer Gewerkschaftsbund) in Austria.
In addition, the author conducted five interviews with representatives
from business associations and other sector experts. These interviews
are not systematically exploited but rather used as background information
on the process of sector formation. Union journals and internal union
documents were analysed. The two professional journals of the German-
speaking call centre sectors, Callcenter profi and teletalk, contained helpful
background information.
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Trade Unions as Strategic Organizations: Core Strategies
of Austrian and German Trade Unions
Trade unions in advanced capitalist countries currently face similar chal-
lenges: employers’ demands for increasing flexibility, the shift from
manufacturing to private services, growing unemployment, the decline of
corporatism. Under the influence of the ‘new institutionalism’, most ana-
lyses of the strategic responses of trade unions to these challenges concen-
trate on the institutional configuration of the industrial relations system or
the national capitalist model as explanatory factors (Hall and Soskice, 2001;
Thelen, 2002). But though institutions endow trade unions with specific
capacities they do not prescribe their behaviour. Empirical research has
shown that the strategic responses of trade unions across countries to
apparently similar challenges differ not only in terms of their content but in
terms of their intra-union priorities and their timing (Clegg, 1976; Martin
and Ross, 1999; Turner, 1991). In order to understand the logics of these
strategic responses we therefore cannot restrict ourselves to studying what
unions do, we have to analyze what they do not do. Why do unions address
certain issues but ignore others? Why do they prioritize certain challenges
over others?
As Locke and Thelen argue (1995: 359), ‘seemingly different, nationally
specific conflicts are in fact analytically analogous’, and vice versa. The dif-
ference in meaning of apparently similar challenges is explained by refer-
ring to the specific identities of historically existing trade unions: they
assign a higher priority to a challenge if it conflicts with their established
identity. However, Hyman (2001a: 219f.) correctly stresses that Locke and
Thelen’s causal explanation suffers from ‘an implicit circularity’. Unions’
identities are themselves subject to change, they are not fixed but fluid and
internally as well as externally contested (see Hyman, 2001b). Potentially,
an organization has at least as many identities as members.
In order to avoid these pitfalls and to facilitate meaningful comparison of
the logics underlying different unionisms, I introduce the concept of union
core strategies. This builds on insights from organizational sociology,
and aims to conceptualize the variegated impact of apparently similar chal-
lenges on the strategic capacities of trade unions across countries. The core
strategies fulfil a crucial function for unions since trade unions are ‘univer-
sally organizations for the representation of interests’ (Hyman, 1996: 55).
They are thus the central means by which unions seek to prove their spe-
cific claim to representativeness, whether its scope is class, region, industry
or company (see Streeck, 1993).
Note that my use of the notion of ‘strategy’ departs from its common
use in sociology and game theory, where it is typically associated with
conscious, rational decisions based on an instrumental and a long-term
perspective (Crow, 1989). Though unions pursue instrumental goals 
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(the representation of the interests of their constituencies), the content of
union strategy is deeply embedded in habitual and routine practices.
Sociologically, union organizations are not uniform actors, and their
strategic responses are the product of social processes consisting of
reproductive and transformative behaviour by individual members of the
organizations who are enabled and constrained by formal organization
structures and norms of ‘appropriate’ behaviour.
Since their core strategies are the very means to prove their claim of rep-
resenting workers’ interests, unions are sensitive to developments impair-
ing their capacities to pursue their core strategies successfully. Therefore,
the central assumption is that the more a challenge impairs a union’s capaci-
ties to pursue its core strategies successfully, the higher the priority it
assigns to addressing the challenge. Under conditions of scarce resources,
a higher intra-union priority means more resources are devoted to the
challenge. Changes in an organization’s environment are by definition
ambiguous; they require interpretation (March and Olsen, 1994).
Therefore, organizations permanently monitor and evaluate the impact
of their own actions on their environment (Argyris and Schön, 1978;
Hedberg, 1981). Sociologically, union organizations are not uniform
actors. A union’s pursuit of its core strategies is the outcome of coord-
inated behaviour of its individual members being enabled and constrained
by formal organization structures, intra-organization politics and norms
of ‘appropriate’ behaviour.
Whether union organizations respond to challenges by reproducing or
by revising their core strategies is the outcome of potential internal con-
flicts, and thus an empirical question. Note that even radical ‘revitali-
zation’ efforts such as the introduction of the organizing-model by
American trade unions can be analytically understood as the strategic
responses of bureaucratic organizations to the specific crisis of the union
organization, involving a perception that established core strategies are
exhausted. Below, the concept of union core strategies is applied in an
attempt to understand the strategic behaviour of unions as organizations
and therefore to ‘contextualize’ the cross-country comparison of unions’
strategic responses to the emergence of the call centre sector. It will be
shown that German and Austrian unions formally pursue the same core
strategies: negotiating sectoral agreements. However, their strategic capaci-
ties to pursue these core strategies are contingent upon different founda-
tions in both countries, and thus vulnerable to different developments.
Union Core Strategies in Austria and Germany
Austria and Germany are known as the prototypes of the so-called ‘dual
system’ of interest representation. Collective bargaining at sectoral level
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is the exclusive domain of trade unions (Tarifautonomie), while works
councils possess a separate range of competences at company level.
Despite their formal mutual independence, a symbiotic relationship
between works councils and trade unions developed in both countries
(Schmidt and Trinczek, 1999). Additionally, current trends towards
greater flexibility point in the same direction: Austrian and German
unions both have been pushed and pulled to relocate competencies to the
firm-level and to strengthen the influence of works councils (Baethge and
Wolf, 1995).
While trade unions pursue similar core strategies, the conditions for
successful strategic action differ in both countries. This argument can be
illustrated by differences in the outcomes of collective bargaining. First,
bargaining coverage in Austria is significantly higher and more stable than
in Germany. In Austria the coverage of collective agreements is still virtu-
ally universal (more than 95 percent), but in Germany it has declined to
roughly two-thirds. Second, despite the encompassing scope of collective
agreements, wage dispersion both in terms of contractual and real wages
throughout the post-war period has been significantly higher in Austria
than in Germany (Wallerstein, 1999; OECD, 2004).
Both differences can be traced back to the distinctive corporatist trad-
ition in Austria, with obligatory membership of employers in the
Wirtschaftskammer Österreich (WKÖ). Since firms cannot leave the
employers’ association in order to bypass existing collective agreements,
the erosion of the system of sectoral agreements is institutionally pre-
vented; hence while German unions are mainly fighting defensive strug-
gles, Austrian unions have been successful in achieving agreements for
new economic sectors (Hermann and Flecker, 2006). The greater wage
dispersion in Austria is the result of ‘pattern bargaining’ oriented towards
general economic goals such as productivity growth and employment
security (Rosner, 1999; Traxler, 2001); wage equality was never high on
the union agenda. Furthermore, the industrial unionism principle is much
less dominant: the peak association (ÖGB) enjoys considerable power
over its affiliates, while a powerful white-collar affiliate (GPA) exists
alongside blue-collar unions. Although the unions cooperate closely,
manual and white-collar workers in most companies are subject to two
different collective agreements signed by different unions. By pursuing a
productivity-oriented bargaining strategy based on wage restraint,
Austrian unions contribute to the legitimacy of the encompassing nature
of collective agreements. In Germany the outcomes of collective bargain-
ing are to a great extent determined by intra-sector dynamics such as
worker mobilization and economic growth (Bispinck, 1993).
To summarize, the core strategies of both Austrian and German
unions involve negotiating industry agreements. However, in Austria
this is at least partly a politico-administrative process, while in Germany
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it is a purely industrial endeavour. In Germany collective bargaining is
almost exclusively dependent on intra-sectoral contingencies: economic
conditions and unions’ capacities to mobilize core workers for industrial
action. Austrian unions are less dependent on the support of core workers.
The bargaining process is to a certain extent autonomous from intra-sector
developments and more contingent on general political-economic dynamics.
These differences have an impact on the particular vulnerabilities of union
core strategies, hence we can expect unions in both countries to react
differently to similar political-economic challenges associated with the
development of the call centre field.
The Formation of the Call Centre Sector in Austria 
and Germany
In both Austria and Germany, data on the emerging call centre field are
scarce since it is not yet covered by official statistics. According to recent
estimates, in Germany there are currently some 5000 call centres, employ-
ing 330,000 workers (DDV, 2005; Holtgrewe, 2005); while in Austria
there are 400 to 500, employing 30,000 workers (Schönauer, 2005).4 Thus
in both countries, call centres account for roughly one percent of total
employment. The similar relative size of the sector in both countries facili-
tates meaningful comparison.
The following section discusses the historical development of the sec-
tor in Austria and Germany; the focus is on the competitive relations
between organizations. The potential challenges to trade unions’ strategic
capacities are mapped by applying a market-sociological approach
inspired by the new economic sociology (Bourdieu, 2005; Dobbin, 2004).
Since outsourcing to subcontracting call centres is an important driving
force in the process of sector formation, it is important to distinguish two
dimensions of competition: first between internal and subcontracting call
centres, and second among subcontractors for clients.5 Note that the first
dimension of competition constitutes a particular challenge to Austrian
and German unions since it crosses the boundaries of established sectors
as bargaining domains. Three parallel periods of sector formation can be
identified in both countries, each characterized by specific competitive
relations within the sector: establishment, expansion and consolidation.
The establishment period of the call centre sector started in both coun-
tries with the introduction of ACD (Automatic Call Distribution) tech-
nology in 1990. Internal call centres were the dominant type during the
early years. The overall growth rates were limited and employment
effects were small. In 1995, fewer than 50,000 workers were employed in
German call centres (DDV, 2005); employment in Austrian call centres
was equally marginal (Böhm et al., 1999). Consequently, competition had a
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rather low intensity on both dimensions. There was neither intense price-
competition between internal and subcontracting call centres nor
amongst subcontractors. Thus, there were few pressures on wages.
The development of the call centre sector changed its dynamic in
both countries during the expansion period from the second half of the
1990s (Holtgrewe, 2005; Schönauer, 2005). Growth rates accelerated particu-
larly around the millennium. Three factors triggered rapid expansion: first,
the introduction of CTI (Computer Telephony Integration) technology;
second, the political liberalization of telecommunications; and third,
a shift in corporate governance stressing flexibility and cost reduction.
Outsourcing of repetitive, simple call centre services grew rapidly in volume
as a means to externalize pressures for flexibility and cost reduction
(Holtgrewe and Kerst, 2002). The expansion of the emerging call centre
sector was mainly an expansion of the segment of subcontracting call
centres which significantly increased the share of subcontractors within
the total. Competition intensified in both dimensions: between internal
and subcontracting call centres in sectors such as telecommunications,
retail, finance and tourism as well as among subcontractors. Moreover,
competition was mainly (labour) cost-oriented which placed consider-
able pressure on wages in both internal and subcontracting call centres.
Consolidation followed a short but severe crisis, with numerous bank-
ruptcies of subcontractors in 2001–2 in Germany and 2002–3 in Austria.
Growth rates declined but remained stable at a moderate level. Sub-
contractors aim at establishing stable, long-term relationships to their
clients. Particularly in telecommunications but in other sectors as well
relatively stable production networks evolved, consisting of internal
call centres and various subcontractors. After outsourcing of simple
and repetitive services, the remaining internal call centres produce high-
quality services or deal with sensitive information. Additional outsourcing
concerns more complex and thus trust-dependent services (business
process outsourcing) and new sectors such as pharmaceuticals or energy.
Thereby, the competitive relations between internal and subcontracting
call centres changed their focus to quality, so that labour costs were no
longer the most important determinants of competition, thus reducing
the pressure on wages in the remaining internal call centres. At the same
time, competition among subcontractors was still mostly cost-oriented,
leading to continuous pressures on wages in subcontractors.
Union Strategies towards Call Centres in Germany
Sector Establishment (Up to 1995)
In general, German unions assigned a very low priority during the early
1990s to call centres in the mail order business and in telecommunications.
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Neither HBV nor DPG pursued a distinct call centre strategy, nor
did they dedicate significant resources to unionizing activities. Call
centres did not seem to threaten the strategic capacities of either union.
While HBV’s strategic response in retail can be classified as ‘tacit accept-
ance’, DPG’s response in telecommunications resembled ‘business
as usual’.
In terms of collective bargaining the German mail order business is part
of the retail sector. Here, in contrast to other sectors, subcontracting and
spin-offs were quite common in the early 1990s. The joint venture
between one of Germany’s largest telemarketing companies and a sub-
sidiary of a leading mail order company can serve as an example. The par-
ent company outsourced its order hotline in 1993 to a new company
which did not join the employers’ association so as to evade the retail sec-
tor agreement. The new company not only paid lower wages but resort-
ed to freelance work to increase flexibility and reduce labour costs. It is
significant to note that the new company later became one of the largest
subcontractors in Germany.
Although outsourcing to subcontractors was prevalent in the mail
order business, call centres received a low intra-union priority in HBV’s
retail domain since the mail order business only represented some five
percent of the retail sector. Therefore outsourcing did not significantly
change the competitive relationship within the union’s bargaining
domain or weaken its strategic capacities in collective bargaining in retail.
On the contrary, since outsourcing prevented core workforces from
unpopular night and weekend shifts (Holtgrewe and Kerst, 2002) it may
have helped to stabilize the sector agreement.
The situation in telecommunications was different. Until 1996 the sec-
tor was dominated by a public enterprise. Thanks to its close ties with
the staff councils (Personalräte), DPG managed to exercise considerable
influence on the local work organization in the newly established internal
call centres. Although some atypical employment, with the risk of
turning precarious, existed even within the confines of the public enter-
prise, internal call centres did not have a high priority for DPG.
The union’s aim was to prevent new work organization and technology
from having negative effects on workers. This goal could be achieved
without unionizing the call centre workers. DPG included ‘qualitative’
issues in collective bargaining such as VDU work and performance
control.
Expansion Period (1996–2001)
The situation changed during the expansion period. In particular, the
DPG responded to the changing competitive relations in its main domain,
the telecommunications sector, by significantly increasing the priority of
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call centres. The union aimed at organizing workers in internal and
subcontracting call centres to regain lost strategic capacities. In contrast,
HBV continued its passive stance towards call centres in the mail order
business.
The deep segmentation in the telecommunications sector between the
former monopolist Deutsche Telekom (DT) and new rival companies was
reflected in a similar split in the strategies pursued by DPG. The union
continued its consultation strategy with works councils in highly union-
ized DT companies in order to influence the implementation of new
call centre technology at local level. Simultaneously, DPG implemented
resource-intensive unionizing projects in the new rival telecommunica-
tion companies. The intense price competition between subcontracting
and internal call centres resulted in strong pressures on wages in internal
call centres. DPG’s strategic capacities in collective bargaining at DT were
severely impaired.
Recruiting workers in the new companies thus became a strategic
imperative. In 1999, DPG launched an organizing project and spent con-
siderable resources on organizing workers in internal and subcontract-
ing call centres. The project involved a three-step strategy: establishing
works councils, negotiating company agreements with market leaders,
and concluding a sector agreement for subcontractors to prevent ‘social
dumping’ (Dürotin, 1999). However, the project did not restore DPG’s
strategic capacities since the union failed to recruit a significant number
of workers. In the light of its low organizational basis, DPG and later
ver.di had to revert to negotiating compensation plans and transition
periods when confronted with outsourcing.
While call centres in the telecommunications sector enjoyed a signifi-
cant increase in intra-union priority during the expansion period, the pri-
ority of call centres in the mail order business remained low. HBV and
DAG did not dedicate significant resources to call centres in the mail
order business nor did they pursue a distinct organizing strategy. Despite
the passive approach of both unions, they finalized a company agreement
on call centres in the mail order business with one of the largest German
mail order companies. However, the agreement was an outcome of union
weakness rather than strength: the management threatened to outsource
all of its internal call centres if the unions did not agree to an agreement
that adjusted the sector agreement in retail to meet its needs. Because of
the lack of membership the unions’ strategic capacities in the negotiations
were weak; thus by agreeing to concession bargaining HBV and DAG
managed to stabilize the sectoral agreement in retail. After the union
merger in 2001, ver.di even managed to extend the company agreement to
a regional sectoral agreement for call centres in retail. It attempted to pre-
vent cost competition between internal and subcontracting call centres in
retail by extending the agreement to subcontractors operating in retail,
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but because of the lack of membership of subcontracting call centres in
the employer association this was unsuccessful.
Consolidation (since 2002)
While call centres attracted greater intra-union priority during the expan-
sion period, in the consolidation period ver.di stopped dedicating signifi-
cant resources to unionizing them and assumed a rather passive role. The
altered competitive relationship between internal and subcontracting call
centres, particularly in telecommunications, eased the pressures on
ver.di’s strategic capacities.
In telecommunications, ver.di continued its technological consultation
policy in DT companies, but because of severe financial difficulties
stopped its (mostly unsuccessful) unionizing efforts with subcontractors.
The union’s strategic capacities in call centres in both segments of tele-
communications were limited by low membership. DT management has
recently announced plans to restructure its internal call centres in order
to reduce labour costs. Furthermore, low wages in subcontractors are
used by management to pressure unions into accepting lower wages in
DT call centres. This may oblige ver.di to give higher priority to call cen-
tres; but at the time of writing, the outcome remains uncertain.
As in previous periods, call centres in the mail order business enjoyed
a low intra-union priority. The regional sectoral agreement mentioned
above still formally exists but has become rather hollow. Employers in
retail frequently hive-off their call centres and the new companies do not
join the regional employers’ association. In practice, the sectoral agree-
ment is no more than a single-company agreement.
The union merger in 2001 changed the unions’ organization structures
for subcontractors. In general, it strengthened the sectoral logic (Keller,
2004). From 2001, subcontractors have become a distinct union domain
within the department of ‘miscellaneous services’, hence they are organ-
izationally separated from in-house call centres. Not surprisingly, ver.di’s
goal is to negotiate a sectoral agreement for subcontractors; but financial
resources for unionizing subcontractors are small. The combination of
low membership and the union’s financial crisis means that its strategic
capacities are limited. It cannot redistribute resources internally, a neces-
sary precondition for organizing a previously non-unionized field.
Despite these problems the union has managed to finalize a framework
agreement (Rahmentarifvertrag) with one of the leading subcontracting
companies, Walter Telemedien. The central component of the agreement
is an annualized work-time record which serves the interests of both
employers and workers. However, further success is unlikely without
upgrading the intra-union priority of call centres and the allocation of
new resources to organizing efforts.
025-045 EJD-086110.qxd  17/1/08  05:06 PM  Page 34
Holst: Political Economy of TU Strategies in Austria and Germany
35
Union Strategies towards Call Centres in Austria
Sector Establishment (Up to 1997)
The strategic responses from Austrian unions have been remarkably dif-
ferent. Call centres fell exclusively into the domain of the white-collar
union GPA. In general, the union responded proactively to the emer-
gence of call centres and assigned medium priorities to all three segments
of the call centre field during the early stages of field formation.
GPA was confronted with subcontractors as early as 1996. Following the
procedures of Austrian social partnership, the government invited
the GPA and the WKÖ to approve an exemption for call centres from
the prohibition of weekend and holiday work. The request for exemp-
tion was filed by a German subcontractor planning to open a branch in
Salzburg (Böhm et al., 1999). GPA initially refused, making its consent
contingent on the establishment of a works council in the new company
and the general incorporation of subcontractors into the system of
collective agreements; but in March 1997 the government issued the
exemption.
Simultaneously, GPA had begun negotiations with its bargaining
counterpart over the incorporation of subcontractors into the encom-
passing system of collective agreements (Böhm et al., 1999). Both GPA
and the employers’ association lacked experience with call centres.
Therefore a representative of the German subcontractor participated
in the negotiations and its Austrian branch later became one of the first
subcontractors in Austria. In rather bureaucratic fashion the bargaining
partners agreed to incorporate those call centres not covered by other
sectoral agreements into the agreement for miscellaneous business
(Allgemeines Gewerbe). Thus, since 1998 Austrian subcontractors have
been covered by a collective agreement.
GPA pursued a similar proactive bargaining strategy in the liberalized
telecommunications sector. With the postal union for the public service
sector it negotiated in 1998 a collective agreement for the so-called ‘alter-
native’ telecommunication companies. This extended central provisions of
the agreement for the former state monopoly Telekom Austria (TA), such as
wages, weekly work time and wage groupings, to the new rival compan-
ies. The agreement covered both the rivals of TA and its subsidiaries, and
thus most internal call centres in the telecommunications sector. The
union exerted successful political pressure for a legal regulation prevent-
ing companies controlled or owned (more than 50 percent) by TA to depart
from the telecommunication agreements. In other sectors, unions had no
means of impeding spin-offs to switch to a ‘cheaper’ collective agreement.
Companies were automatically subsumed into a collective agreement
according to their affiliation to one of the subunits of WKÖ.
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Similar strategies were pursued by GPA in the mail order business. As in
Germany, this is an important sector for subcontracting call centres. In
1999 GPA and WKÖ signed a collective agreement for these call centres
based on the collective agreement for retail. GPA hoped to prevent out-
sourcing by adjusting the sector agreement in retail to the specific needs of
call centres (GPA, 1999). However, the agreement was largely a formality
since it does not cover smaller firms.
Expansion Period (1998–2002)
GPA’s strategic response to the expansion of the call centre field has been
remarkably consistent, re-negotiating annually the sectoral agreements.
While intra-union priority of German call centres increased during the
expansion period because of intense competition between internal and
subcontracting call centres, similar competitive relations did not cause
GPA to increase the priority of call centres in a similar manner.
In Austria, the establishment of several new telecommunications com-
panies and the subsequent growth of this sector occurred against the
backdrop of a pre-existing sectoral agreement. This was re-negotiated
annually, with wage increases linked to general productivity trends.
Recruiting workers in the telecommunications call centres was not a
union priority: GPA’s strategic capacities in collective bargaining were
not impaired by either increased outsourcing or subsequent cost com-
petition between internal and subcontracting call centres. The topics that
featured prominently on the bargaining agenda were flexible working
time and technological change. GPA cooperated closely with unionized
works councils to influence the implementation of technological change
at workplace level (Angerler, 1999). The long-term goal of the GPA was
to negotiate a unitary sector agreement covering both TA and its rivals,
thus simplifying the bargaining process; but two distinct agreements still
exist.
Closely intertwined with changes in telecommunications was GPA’s
strategic response to the expansion of subcontractors. In contrast to
German experience, the upsurge of subcontractors in Austria took place
within the context of their integration into the encompassing system of
collective agreements. Though GPA’s long-term goal was to negotiate a
specific call centre sector agreement, the employers showed little interest,
instead the agreement for Allgemeines Gewerbe was re-negotiated annu-
ally. However, wage increases were virtually identical in the various sector
agreements, being linked to general productivity growth. The strategic
capacities of GPA were not impaired by cost competition between inter-
nal and subcontracting call centres, nor did the incorporation of both
segments into the encompassing system of collective agreements prevent
cost competition between companies. A study of regional call centres in
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Salzburg revealed that particular subcontractors bypassed collective
agreements by replacing their regular workforces with self-employed
workers in order to reduce labour costs. In 1999, 77 percent of workers in
subcontracting firms were self-employed and on a free-lance contract
(Böhm et al., 1999). In most companies only the management held a
regular employment contract.
The freelance contract (freier Dienstvertrag) is an Austrian peculiarity.
It was introduced in 1998 in order to include free-lance workers in the
social security system (Pernicka, 2005). However, employers in call centres
use it as an intra-plant means to bypass collective agreements, since these
only apply to dependent employees. The self-employed are excluded both
from collective agreements and from basic labour law provisions such as
sick-pay leave and unemployment insurance. Thus, subcontractors using
freelance contracts are formally subject to collective agreements, but the
majority of their workforce is excluded.
GPA formally protested against these evasion practices and claimed that
the use of the freelance contract in call centres is a form of false self-
employment (Angerler, 1999). However, GPA did not assign a high prior-
ity to this campaign. In general, dependent self-employed workers received
little attention, although GPA reformed its organization structure in 2000
and established a distinct interest group for the representation of their
interests. The union’s official position was that dependent self-employment
in call centres represents illegal, spurious self-employment, and its activities
for the self-employed were limited to legal assistance. Therefore, the inter-
ests of the dependent self-employed were not incorporated in collective
bargaining (Pernicka, 2005). From the perspective of the union the incorp-
oration of subcontractors into the overall system of collective agreements
represented a success. However, these agreements did not prevent intense
cost competition between internal and subcontracting call centres, and had
little influence on work and pay conditions in subcontractors.
Consolidation (since 2003)
Union strategic responses changed little during the consolidation period,
with the annual re-negotiation of the three sectoral agreements. Intra-
union priorities also remained unchanged. However, evasion practices in
the call centres also continued. Today, more than 70 percent of all
subcontractors and 20 percent of all internal call centres in Austria resort
to freelance contracts. The importance of these evasion practices is
illustrated by the fact that on average employers resorting to these
contracts have more than 80 percent of their workforce self-employed
(Schönauer, 2005).
Until recently, employers did not encounter a great deal of union
resistance. However, in the summer of 2006 GPA started a campaign to
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organize workers in both internal call centres and subcontractors.
Together with the social insurance agencies,6 GPA pursued a test case
challenging the legality of freelance contracts in call centres. This cam-
paign was initiated by the interest group for dependent self-employed
workers, which improved its position within the union by contributing
to the union’s core strategy. Responding to these pressures, some em-
ployers favoured negotiations for a specific collective agreement for call
centres. However, due to its lack of membership in subcontractors GPA
could not force employers into collective bargaining, so a collective
agreement for call centres is still not in reach. By the time of writing,
union activities in call centres have once again lost momentum. 
Conclusions
Trade unions’ strategic responses in Austria and Germany to the emer-
gence of the call centre sector reveal a surprising degree of variation.
Despite overall similarities in the industrial relations systems and the
emergence of the call centre sector, union responses varied considerably
in terms of institutional outcomes, intra-union priorities and timing. The
research design facilitated both intra- and cross-country comparison of
these responses. Table 1 summarizes the empirical findings. The conclu-
sions will start with intra-country comparisons focusing on what the
unions did and did not do. Particular attention will be paid to the impact
of the change in competitive relations on the capacities of unions to pur-
sue their core strategies successfully. Subsequently, the results from the
research will be used to draw general inferences on Austrian and German
trade unionism and industrial relations.
In the Austrian case, there was very little variation across the three
periods and between the three segments in intra-union priorities. GPA
pursued an active, indeed proactive strategy in all three segments.
Particularly striking is the successful incorporation of subcontracting call
centres into the encompassing system of collective agreements. As a lead-
ing GPA official put it: ‘first came the collective agreement, and then
came the employees’. GPA and its bargaining counterpart WKÖ negoti-
ated a collective agreement for subcontractors before that segment had
significant employment effects. Since then, annual wage increases were
negotiated within the framework of ‘pattern bargaining’, leaving the dif-
ferences between the agreements virtually unchanged.
Another striking finding in the Austrian case is that during the three
periods the variegated competitive relations had no influence on union
strategic responses. As noted, wage increases followed general product-
ivity trends, whether or not there was competition between the internal
and subcontracting call centres (establishment period), intense price
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competition both between internal and subcontracting call centres and
among subcontractors (expansion period), or quality competition
between internal and subcontracting call centres (consolidation period).
Note that the wage differences between the agreements were the primary
driving force for price competition between internal and subcontracting
call centres. Diverse competitive relations within the market had no
impact on unions’ capacities to pursue their core strategies. Because of
the employer’s obligatory membership in WKÖ and ‘pattern bargaining’
the strategic capacities of Austrian unions are institutionally insulated
from competitive pressures in the call centre market.
By contrast, in Germany there were marked changes over the three
periods and variation between the three segments. Changing strategic
responses across the three periods of sector formation can be explained
by the altered competitive relations. Unlike the Austrian unions, the
German unions did not respond to call centres during the establishment
period. In all segments their responses can be classified as ignorance or
tacit acceptance. The intra-union priority of call centres did not increase
before intense price competition between internal and subcontracting
centres impaired unions’ capacities to pursue their core strategies. This
inference can be drawn from the subsequent diminished priority during
the consolidation period when competition among subcontractors began
focusing on quality. Thus, the strategic capacities of German unions are
particularly vulnerable to competition crossing the boundaries of estab-
lished bargaining domains.
The variation between the segments is as striking as the changes across
periods. While DPG responded to the price competition between internal
and subcontracting call centres in telecommunications, HBV did
not respond to similar competitive relations within retail. This can be
explained by the differing impact of price competition on unions’ capaci-
ties to pursue their core strategies. DPG’s strategic capacities in telecom-
munications collective bargaining were challenged by employers’ demands
for downward adjustment of labour costs in internal call centres. In
retail, cost competition between internal and subcontracting call centres
did not have the same effect on HBV’s strategic capacities. Call centres in
retail are mainly limited to the segment of the mail order business which
itself is only a small fraction of the bargaining domain.
Cross-country comparison reveals that unions in both countries
responded to the challenges posed by the emergence of call centres accord-
ing to the capacities endowed by the industrial relations system and the dif-
fering impact of these challenges on unions’ capacities to pursue their core
strategies. Unions in both countries attempted to regulate the work and
pay conditions in call centres with collective agreements. Without doubt,
the similar contents of the strategic responses can be linked to the industrial
relations institutions in both countries. The Austrian case is an example
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of institutional reproduction: the unions successfully incorporated call
centres into the encompassing system of collective agreements. In contrast,
the German case is an example of institutional erosion: the industrial rela-
tions system is eroding from its margins, with the growing segment of sub-
contractors but one example of declining bargaining coverage. It is thus
remarkable that German unions did not revise their strategies: alternatives
were proposed but not adopted. Thus, both success in Austria and failure
in Germany reinforced the intra-union status of the core strategies.
Despite their apparently similar content, the core strategies of Austrian
and German unions differ remarkably. It is important to note that unions
as strategic organizations in both countries responded to the impact of
call centres on their capacities to pursue their core strategies rather than
to the low pay and poor working conditions found in the subcontracting
call centres. Austrian unions did not increase the priority given to call
centres when evasion practices in subcontracting led to a worsening of
pay and working conditions for call centre workers. Similarly, German
unions did not respond to the analogous worsening in retail caused by
intensified cost competition.
The differences in the priority and timing of strategic responses can be
explained by the differential impact of the emergence of the call centre
sector on unions’ strategic capacities. These capacities are more closely
linked to economic trends within the bargaining domains in Germany
than in Austria. German unions need members in the companies to force
employers into collective bargaining, Austrian unions do not. Moreover,
bargaining outcomes in Germany strongly reflect economic conditions
in the sector; but institutional supports and ‘pattern bargaining’ entail
that the strategic capacities of Austrian unions are relatively independent
from the membership base and the economic situation of individual bar-
gaining domains. This is reflected in the significantly higher bargaining
coverage.
Unions in Austria have higher capacities to bargain collective agree-
ments but they do not necessarily have higher strategic capacities in col-
lective bargaining. The analysis has shown that unions in both countries
lacked the means to prevent labour costs from becoming the primary factor
of competition between internal and subcontracting call centres during
the expansion period. A brief comparison of the current wage differ-
ences between the segments confirms this. In both countries, contractual
wages are highest in telecommunications: the entry-level contractual
wage for full-time work in call centres of TA is 84 percent of the national
median net income, compared to 79 percent at DT: the lower wages in
Germany are the result of downward pressures of extensive outsourcing.
Wages in subcontractors are considerably lower in both countries: the
entry-level wage in the Allgemeines Gewerbe agreement is 74 percent of
the median net income. In the absence of collective agreements, wages in
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German subcontractors are more dispersed but not generally lower
(Holst et al., 2006). However, those with freelance contracts in Austria
receive the lowest income, and are not covered by sickness or holiday
pay. Thus, evidence suggests that wage dispersion in call centres is
higher in Austria than in Germany, despite the higher formal bargaining
coverage.
Trade unions in both countries negotiate collective agreements as their
core strategies; but collective agreements have different political-
economic meanings in Austria and Germany. The negotiation process has
a politico-administrative character in Austria while in Germany its char-
acter is essentially industrial. Sectoral agreements were considered to be
one of the central components of the German model because they forced
employers into ‘diversified quality production’; Austrian collective agree-
ments had and still have a smaller impact on companies’ production
strategies. Wage restraint in the form of relatively high wage differenti-
ation across and within sectors is a central component of pattern bargain-
ing in Austria. Compared to their German neighbours, Austrian unions
exchange the institutional support of their capacities to bargain collective
agreements with consensual restraint in wage bargaining.
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NOTES
1 Though political scientists have stressed the differences, describing Austria
as a far more corporatist country than Germany (Lehmbruch and Schmitter,
1982).
2 Many call centres operate simultaneously in several segments; thus the 
segments are overlapping. For analytical purposes, however, we can treat
them as distinct units of analysis.
3 ver.di was formed in 2001 through the merger of four DGB affiliates, two of
which – the banking and commercial union HBV and the postal workers’
union DPG – covered the call centre sector, with the independent white-collar
confederation DAG.
4 Similar estimates are given by Datamonitor (2002a, 2002b).
5 A similar distinction was made by Weber (1980), who analysed markets in
terms of the social relationship between exchange partners (‘interest struggle’)
and the relationship among competitors (‘competition struggle’).
Contemporary economics usually refers to the first dimension of competition
as the ‘make or buy’ decision (Williamson, 1975).
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6 These were concerned because employer contributions to the social security
systems are significantly lower for all forms of self-employment than for
standard forms of dependent employment.
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